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Women, Gender Relations and Sanctions in Iraq

Nadje Al-Ali
The Institute of Arab & Islamic Studies
University of Exeter, UK

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The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Women in Iraq

Between Dreams and Sanctions: Teenage Lives in Iraq

This paper has been written after observations, discussions and interviews with Iraqi women of various social backgrounds conducted by the author. It present only preliminary research and broadly sketches out certain trends and general transformations rather than rigorous research and quantifiable data. This paper focuses on social and cultural changes rather than issues related to malnutrition, health-care and mortality rates.

Iraqi women as well as men are not a homogeneous group and have been affected in different ways; ethnic and religious differences; rural and urban; maybe most importantly, however, in the context of sanctions is the social class of the respective woman.

For women of low-income classes within urban areas or poor women living in the countryside sheer survival has become the main aim of their lives. There is no doubt about the fact that it is particularly the poor mothers whose children are more likely to become yet another statistic in the incredibly high child mortality rates or who suffer from disease and malnutrition. Yet even for educated women who were part of the broad and well-off middle-classes of Iraq, feeding their children has become the major worry and focus. Hana’, who has recently left Iraq and now lives in London recalls: "I would feed my children and my husband before eating anything myself. Often I would stay hungry. I would also feed my children before visiting anyone. Before the sanctions people were very generous. You would always serve tea and biscuits if not a meal when a visitor came. Now people stopped visiting each other so that they do not embarrass each other."

Sanctions with their lot of massive impoverishment and insecurity have subjected women of various social backgrounds to considerable material strain: household management in the context of electricity cuts and water shortages is time-consuming, exhausting and frustrating. Just an example: bread is now too expensive to buy on the market and many Iraqi women have no other choice but to bake their own bread on a daily basis, using the flour ration distributed by the government. Besides, food storage is largely impossible in certain because of the frequent electricity cuts.

Aside from the more obvious effects related to basic survival strategies and difficulties, sanctions also left its mark on the social and cultural fabric of Iraqi society. Without doubt, Iraqi women lost some of the achievements gained in the previous decades. They can no longer assert themselves through the previous channels of promotion, that is education and waged employment.

And here some background is needed: The 70s and early 80s were the years of general economic boom and the emergence and expansion of a broad middle-class. State-induced policies worked to eradicate illiteracy, educate women and incorporate them into the labour force. The initial period after the nationalisation of the Iraqi oil industry in 1972 was characterised by economic hardship and difficulties. However, the oil embargo by OPEC countries of 1973, known as the "oil crisis" crisis was followed by a period of boom and expansion. Oil prices shot up considerably and oil-producing countries started to become aware of their bargaining power related to western countries dependence on oil. In the context of this rapid economic expansion the Iraqi government actively sought out women to incorporate them into the labour force. In 1974, a government decree stipulated that all university graduates - whether men or women – would be employed automatically. In certain profession, such as those related to health-care and teaching, education itself entailed a contract with the government, which obliged the students to take up a job in the respective profession. Without doubt, policies of encouraging women to enter waged work can not be explained in terms of egalitarian or even feminist principles, even tough several women I talked to, did positively comment on the early Baathists’ policies of women’s social inclusion.

It is beyond the scope of this talk to carefully analyse the specific motivations and ideology of the Baathist regime in terms of women’s roles and positions. But is seems important to mention that labour was scarce, and while the Gulf Countries started to look for labour outside their national boundaries, the Iraqi government tapped into their own human resources. Subsequently, working outside the home did not only become acceptable for women but prestigious and the norm. Another factor, which has to be taken into account, was the state’s attempt to reach out and indoctrinate its citizens –whether male or female. Obviously it was much easier to reach out to and recruit women the moment they were part of the so-called public sphere and visible in their work places. Notably a great number of party members were recruited through their work places.

Whatever the government’s motivations, Iraqi women became among the most educated and professional in the whole region. The question in how far access to education and the labour market had resulted in an improved status for women is more complex. As in many other places, conservative and patriarchal values did not automatically change because women started working. And here there existed great differences between rural and urban women as well as women from different social class backgrounds.

Coming back to present-day Iraq, education and working conditions have deteriorated rapidly. Higher education has virtually collapsed and degrees are worthless in the context of widespread corruption and an uninterrupted exodus of university professors. Monthly salaries in the public sector, which has paradoxically become increasingly staffed by women, have dropped dramatically and do not correspond to high inflation rates and the cost of living.

An educated middle-class woman in her late 40s, let’s call her Wadat, had worked as a teacher in a high school until 1995. She told me: " We did not feel it so much during the first years of the sanctions, but it really hit us by 1994. Social conditions had deteriorated; the currency had been devalued while salaries were fixed. Many women started to quit work. Some of my friends could not even afford transportation to the school. Before the sanctions, the school made sure that we were picked up by a bus, but all this was cut. For me, the most important reason was my children. I did not want them to come home and be alone in the house. It has become too unsafe. And then, I know from my own work that schools have become so bad, because teachers have quit and there is no money for anything. So I felt that I have to teach them at home"

Working women, like Wadat, have suffered from the collapse of their support systems. One previous support system had been funded by the state and consisted of numerous nurseries and kindergarten, free public transportation to and from school as well as to the working places of women. The other support system was based on extended family ties and neighbourly relations, which helped in child care. These days women are reluctant to leave their children with neighbours or other relatives because of the general sense of insecurity.

Crime rates are on the increase. Many women reported that 10 years ago they used to keep all their doors open and felt totally secure. Now there are numerous accounts of burglaries – often violent ones. Also, several mothers told me that their children have become much more needy and clinging after the Gulf war and the continuous threat of bombing. In light of the absence of counselling and therapy, mothers carry the burden of dealing with their traumatised children. There is also a general sense of distrust except within the closed nuclear family. This starkly contrasts traditional cultural values, which put a great emphasis on extended families’ relationships.

Because of the bad conditions in schools due to the lack of resources and teachers, many parents feel that they have to contribute to their children’s education. And parent’s here reads as mothers, which is not unique to Iraq, of course. One refugee woman who has come to the UK 9 months ago stated that she knew of some women who wanted to resign from their jobs in the public sector, because their fixed salaries could not even cover the cost of transportation to and from work. Yet, they felt compelled to continue working because their monthly food ratios were tied to their jobs.

The demographic cost of two wars and the forced economic migration of men triggered by the imposition and continuation of international sanctions account for the high number of female-headed households. It is not only war widows who find themselves without husbands but also women whose husbands left abroad to escape the bleak conditions and find ways to support their families. Other men just abandoned their wives and children, being unable to cope with the inability to live up to the social expectations of being the provider and breadwinner.

Another side affect of the current demographic imbalance between men and women is the difficulty for young women to get married. Polygamy, which had become largely restricted to rural areas or uneducated people has been on the increase in recent years. There is also a growing trend among young women to get married to Iraqi expatriates, usually much older than they are. According to my respondents, there are numerous of cases of women who could not cope living abroad, and are feeling totally alienated from their husbands and the new environment they find themselves in.

Another common phenomenon is what one Iraq woman called "marrying below one’s class". Iraq has traditionally been a very class-oriented society where one’s family name and background might open up or close many doors. Now one can detect greater social mobility and less rigid class barriers. This is partly due to the uneven demographic situation between men and women but also relates to a radical inversion of class structures. The impoverishment of the previously well-off middle classes goes side by side with an emergence of a nouveau riche class of war and sanctions profiteers. As in any tragedy, certain people make money out of sanctions, especially those related to black market trading.

At the same time as marriage has become a relatively difficult undertaking, particularly young women feel pressured by a new "cultural" environment which is marked simultaneously by a decline in moral values pertaining to honesty, generosity and sociability and an increased public religiosity and conservatism. Many women I interviewed concurred with my relatives in Baghdad when they spoke sadly about the total inversion of cultural codes and moral values. I will never forget when one of my aunts told me: "You know, bridges and houses can easily be re-built. It will take time, but it is possible. But what they have really destroyed is our morale, or values." She, like many other Iraqi women I talked to sadly stated that honesty was not paying off anymore. People have become corrupt and greedy. Trust has become very rare word and envy even exists among closest kin.

In the midst of the inversion of moral values and cultural codes, economic hardships and political repression, more and more women (and men) have turned towards religion to find some sort of comfort. Even Manal Younes, the President of the Federation of Iraqi Women affiliated with the Baath party and the regime, is now veiled and ostentatiously pious. The apparent increase in religiosity became very obvious to me during my last trip to Baghdad. None of my aunts or cousins had ever worn the hijab and religion was never a big issue within the family. But now all of my aunts pray regularly, wear the hijab and frequently mention religion and God in their discourses. I personally do not put any value judgement on increased religiosity, in and of itself. Yet, in the Iraqi context, similar to Islamization processes in other countries in the Middle East, the turn towards religion is couples with an increased conservatism and social restrictions which target women specifically.(and it has to be stressed that it is not only Islam but also Christianity, since there still exists a minority of Christians in Iraq). So there has not only been a growing trend towards religiosity by women, but women have also been subjected to increasing social pressures expecting and demanding the expression of religious adherence. For women this often culminates in the question of whether to put up the hijab or not – the hijab being the most visible and obvious sign of religious adherence and supposedly good moral conduct.

Two refugee women in London added another dimension to the complex phenomenon of apparent increase in religiosity when they told me that they only put up the hijab to cover up their hair. Khadija said: " I did not have the money anymore to dye my hair. Even henna was too expensive. And it was also difficult to afford a haircut. My sister did it, and she did a lousy job. I put on the hijab to cover up my awful hair." According to Khadigga there are many women who are more motivated by embarrassment and the sense of shame in terms of their looks rather than religious reasons.

This is not to belittle the societal pressures and restrictions which women are confronted with, but to show that looks can be misleading and that there are numerous motivations for putting up the hijab. The most extreme and sad example of the increased pressures and restrictions on women are the so-called "honour crimes" which have been frequent during the past years and have been legalised.

The growing restrictions on women’s movement and behaviour have to be seen in the context of an incredible increase in prostitution. Both inside Iraq and in neighbouring countries. Most of the female prostitutes in Jordan, for example- are Iraqi women. The imposition by the government of the "mahram" escort for females leaving Iraq did not succeed in stopping this trend. The new law does not allow women to leave the country without being accompanied by a male first of kin, unless they are above 45 years old. This law was enforced after the Jordanian government complained to the Iraqi government about widespread prostitution by Iraqi women in Amman.

Aside from growing religiosity, one can also detect a growing sense of superstition and the turn to spiritual realms. Spirit Possession and exorcism called zar existed before in certain rural areas among uneducated people. But during the past years, more and more women have rekindled old traditions and beliefs and turned to healers, exorcists and witchcraft to deal with their physical and emotional problems. An Iraqi woman who is working with recently arrived refugee women expressed her shock and disbelief to me. Until a few years ago she had never heard that an array of stories and beliefs related to spirits and witchcraft.

Sanctions also seemed to have taken their toll in terms of relationships between husbands and wives. Even though there are no concrete figures, it seems that the divorce rate has increased. A caseworker working with Iraqi refugees in London reported that there is a very high divorce rate among couples who have recently come from Iraq. About 25 % of Iraqi refugees in the UK are either separated or divorced. A few women stated that their husbands have become more violent and abusive since the sanctions. Widespread despair and frustration and the perceived shame of not being able to provide the family with what is needed does not only evoke depression but also anger. Women are often at the receiving end of men’s frustrations.

However, other women told me that their relationships to their husbands improved. Aliya, a housewife in her late 30s said: "My husband never did anything in the house before the sanctions. He used to work in a factory outside of Baghdad. Now that he stopped working, he helps me to bake bread and to take care of the children. We get along much better than before because he started to realise that I am working very hard in the house."

Family planning has become a big source for tension and conflict between husbands and wives. Before the Iran Iraq war all kinds of contraception were available and legal. During the war, contraception was made illegal as the government tried to encourage Iraqi women to "produce" a great number of future citizens to make up the loss in lives during the war. Many incentives were given, such as the extension of a paid maternity leave to 1 year, out of which 6 months were paid. Baby food and articles were imported and subsidised.

These days contraceptives are still not available, but women’s attitudes towards children have changed because of the material circumstances and the moral climate. Unlike previous times, Iraqi women are reluctant to have many children. With abortions being illegal, many women risk their health and their lives to have illegal abortions in back-alleys. The director of an orphanage in Baghdad told me two years ago that they are facing a new phenomenon in Iraq, that is women abandoning new-born babies and placing them on the street. These babies are might be a "result" of so-called illicit relationships, but according the director, are often left by married women who just can’t face not being able to feed their children.

The bleak picture I sketched out only touches upon some aspects of the numerous ways sanctions have affected women. In no way would I want to suggest that sanctions constitute the only negative forces impacting on women’s lives. But I have tried to point to those social and cultural phenomena, which have emerged during the past years and which have to be viewed as triggered by the sanctions.

Let me finish this talk on a slightly brighter note. Let us not forget that Iraqi women are not just passive victims. And here I am not talking about those women who are implicated in the regime. I am talking about ordinary women of different social classes. Contrary to common media representations of oppressed Arab women, in many ways, Iraqi women are more resourceful and adaptable to the new situation than Iraqi men. Small informal business schemes, such as food catering, have mushroomed. Skills in crafts and the recycling of clothes and other materials give evidence to an incredible creativity. And without suggesting that there was anything natural about women being better human beings, if there is any hope for the future of Iraq, it does not lie with fragmented and disputing male opposition, but hope comes form those who have kept their dignity and have remained non-violent and human.

Despite indisputable political repression in the 1970s and 1980s, the majority of the Iraqi population enjoyed high living standards in the context of an economic boom and rapid development, which were a result of the rise of oil prices and the government’s developmental policies. Although signs of deterioration of living standards started to become evident during the years of the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), there seemed to be the prevailing belief that the situation would revert to the better once the war stopped. And while many families lost sons, brothers, fathers, friends and neighbours during this time, life in the cities appeared relatively ‘normal’, with women notably playing a very significant role in public life.